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96 N.C. L. REV. 1175 (2018)

MCDONNELL’S MISAPPREHENSION OF THE
ROLE OF ACCESS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC
CORRUPTION*
INTRODUCTION
Economists often say “there is no such thing as a free lunch.”1 In
other words, although the recipient may not have to immediately pay
cash for a “free” item or service, the donor gives the item with the
expectation of some future benefit. Whether the service is a husband
washing his wife’s dishes in order to choose that night’s movie or one
ignoring his boss kicking her golf ball out of the rough to avoid risking
one’s potential promotion, seemingly benign intentions often have
strings attached. And, while these motives do not implicate a public
legal interest when they occur within a marriage or workplace
relationship, they are alarming in the context of private actors
interacting with public officials. Public officials are delegates whom
the electorate trusts to carry out the public’s will—not the will of the
favored few. When private citizens show up in public officials’ offices
with free lunches—or something much more valuable—the public’s
interest is compromised.
All eight then-sitting United States Supreme Court Justices
ignored this maxim, however, when they overturned former Virginia
Governor Bob McDonnell’s bribery conviction in McDonnell v.
United States. 2 In its decision, the Court narrowly construed the
definition of official act,3 which is an element under most criminal
public corruption statutes. The Court did so because it feared limiting
gift-giving constituents’ access to public officials would limit all
constituents’ access, thus inhibiting the political process.4 However, in
doing so, the Court did not give adequate consideration to the
countervailing policy arguments surrounding access in politics and
misconstrued how federal corruption laws function. The Court acted
as if only the definition of an official act separated ordinary

* © 2018 Jeffrey A. White.
1. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH
(1977) (outlining how all transactions have some bargain attached).
2. 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2016).
3. See id. at 2369–71.
4. Id. at 2372.
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constituent services from public corruption, but federal corruption
laws have multiple elements. Included amongst those elements is a
mens rea element, which the Court could have used to differentiate
situations where public officials provide ordinary constituents public
services and where they corruptly provide special favors to parties
only because they gave the official a gift. Instead of protecting the
political process as it hoped, the Court actually weakened
representative democracy by widening the opportunity for
preferential access.
Further, the McDonnell decision incorrectly narrowed the focus
on which of a public official’s actions constitutes an “official act.”
Federal public corruption crimes have several elements, and an
official act is only one of them.5 The Court, however, did not analyze
how these elements already constrain which “official actions”
constitute violations, especially the mens rea component. Had the
Court done so, it would have seen that providing ordinary constituent
services is illegal only when officials act with some malevolent
intent—ultimately deviating from their responsibility as a delegate of
the people. Instead, the Court unnecessarily challenged itself to draw
a line using only one element instead of all elements.6 In doing so, it
developed a standard that still may be broad enough for lower courts
to apply it in good faith but nonetheless make seemingly
contradictory decisions based on the lower court’s differing policy
conclusions. 7 Consequently, the cramped viewpoint in McDonnell
creates an impractical distinction when it could have simply relied on
a public official’s corrupt intent as the way to best protect ordinary
constituents.
The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides McDonnell’s
background and the Court’s analysis and policy arguments
surrounding “official acts.” Part II disputes the Court’s policy
arguments and explains why it should have been more concerned
about the role preferential access plays in a public official’s day-today decisions. Part III posits that the mens rea element, not the
“official act” element, in federal public corruption crimes is the
correct way to distinguish political access for a concerned constituent
and a wrongly motivated donor. Finally, Part IV analyzes how federal
courts have applied McDonnell’s definition of “official act” thus far
5. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (defining the elements of bribery for public officials);
§ 1951(a) (delineating the elements of Hobbs Act extortion).
6. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365–73 (providing multiple elements of bribery and
Hobbs Act extortion but only addressing the “official act” element in the offenses).
7. See id. at 2371–72 (detailing the new official act standard).
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and considers how this seemingly narrow definition may still give
courts room to follow this precedent while using contrary policy
arguments to reach their holdings.
I. MCDONNELL’S FACTS AND OUTCOME
McDonnell centers around a relationship between a company’s
CEO, a state’s governor, and the state’s first lady. From April 2011 to
January 2012, Johnnie Williams, then the CEO of the Virginia-based
company, Star Scientific, gave then Virginia governor Bob
McDonnell and his wife over $175,000 in gifts and other benefits.8
Although the McDonnells initially rejected Williams’s offers,
including his offering to buy Mrs. McDonnell’s inauguration dress,
they later relented, coincidentally when Williams sought their help
more regularly. 9 The gifts included: a Rolex; a $20,000 shopping
spree; access to Williams’s private plane, Ferrari, and vacation home;
and loans when the McDonnells encountered financial difficulty.10
Although these gifts may seem suspicious, Virginia law, at the time,
permitted constituents to give public officials unlimited gifts as long
as the gifts did not improperly influence the official.11
Unsurprisingly, Williams’s generosity did not go unnoticed by
Governor McDonnell. 12 When Williams approached Governor
McDonnell about Anatabloc, a nutritional supplement created by
Williams’s company, McDonnell listened.13 Williams hoped to have
Virginia universities study Anatabloc so the product would receive
the United States Food and Drug Administration’s approval. 14
Governor McDonnell took several steps to help Williams accomplish
this goal.15 First, he arranged a meeting between Williams and the
Virginia Secretary of Health and Human Resources, who could have
helped Williams convince a Virginia university to perform needed
research studies for Anatabloc.16 Second, after the Secretary declined
8. See id. at 2361–64.
9. See id. at 2362–64.
10. See id.
11. Laura Vozzella, Virginia Legislature Adopts Stricter Gift Standards for Public
Officials, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginiapolitics/virginia-legislature-adopts-stricter-gift-standards/2015/04/17/b400b6a0-e456-11e4-905fcc896d379a32_story.html?utm_term=.0fe2e768e7f2 [https://perma.cc/9P2D-8GQH (staffuploaded archive)]. In the wake of the McDonnell scandal, Virginia has since added giftgiving limitations. See id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3103.1 (2017).
12. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2363.
13. See id. at 2362–64.
14. Id. at 2362.
15. See id. at 2362–64.
16. Id. at 2362.
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to help Williams, McDonnell forwarded even more information to the
Secretary and requested another meeting, this time with Mrs.
McDonnell.17 Third, McDonnell hosted Anatabloc’s launch event at
the governor’s mansion, where he invited university researchers who
were given $25,000 checks by Williams’s company to create grant
proposals to study Anatabloc.18 Fourth, McDonnell later hosted a
healthcare industry reception, which included several guests
recommended by Williams. 19 Fifth, the Governor met with state
employee healthcare administrators to recommend Anatabloc for
state employees’ use as a nutritional supplement.20
After learning of this relationship, federal prosecutors indicted
Governor McDonnell. 21 They charged McDonnell with violating
several criminal statutes that punish government officials’ corrupt
behavior, including honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion,
on the theory that Williams’s gifts and McDonnell’s acceptance
constituted bribery. 22 Although the statutes McDonnell allegedly
violated do not explicitly define bribery, the parties stipulated to
using the federal bribery statute’s definition. 23 Thus, to convict
McDonnell for honest services fraud on a theory of bribery, the
government had to prove that he “directly or indirectly, corruptly”
demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed “‘to receive or
accept anything of value’ in return for being ‘influenced in the

17. Id. at 2363.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2364.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2364–65.
22. Id. at 2365; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012) (making a person who “in any way
or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or
commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or
commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan
or purpose” guilty of extortion under the Hobbs Act); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S.
358, 404 (2010) (defining honest services fraud, as found in § 1346, as “fraudulent schemes
to deprive another of honest services through bribes or kickbacks supplied by a third party
who had not been deceived”).
23. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365. The parties chose the definition of bribery found in
§ 201. Id. The statutes criminalizing Hobbs Act extortion and honest services fraud, which
the government used to charge McDonnell, do not define bribery or official acts. See
§§ 1346; 1952. However, courts regularly reference § 201’s definition when prosecutors
bringing honest services fraud or Hobbs Act extortion charges against public officials. See
Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Defining the Scope Of ‘McDonnell v. United States’,
N.Y. L.J. (2017), https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3977457/25oct2017nylj.pdf [https://perma.cc
/2SAQ-57QA] (“The law governing these statutes has largely converged, with courts
defining Hobbs Act bribery and honest services fraud by reference to the federal bribery
statute and treating their precedents as interchangeable.”).
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performance of any official act.’” 24 For the Hobbs Act extortion
charge, the government needed to prove that McDonnell obtained
these benefits “knowing that the thing of value was given in return for
official action.”25 Notably, both charges required an official act, and
the parties agreed to use the bribery statute’s definition of official act
for the charges.26 After a jury trial in the Eastern District of Virginia,
the jury found McDonnell guilty of honest services fraud and Hobbs
Act extortion based on the prosecution’s bribery theory.27 The Fourth
Circuit later affirmed the convictions.28
Arguing before the Supreme Court, McDonnell contended that
the district court judge erroneously instructed the jury about the
meaning of “official act” within the definition of bribery.29 At trial,
McDonnell had requested that the jury be instructed that “merely
arranging a meeting, attending an event, hosting a reception, or
making a speech are not, standing alone, ‘official acts,’” and “that an
‘official act’ must intend to or ‘in fact influence a specific official
decision the government actually makes.’”30 However, the trial court
rejected these instructions. 31 Without these limiting instructions,
McDonnell argued that the jury could have impermissibly found that
any action an official takes would constitute an “official act.”32
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with McDonnell.33 The
Court narrowly construed the two elements of an official act
necessary for bribery: (1) that some “‘question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy’ [was] . . . ‘pending’ or . . . ‘brought’ before
a public official”; and (2) “that the public official made a decision or
took an action ‘on’ that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or
controversy, or agreed to do so.”34
First, it held that the first element requires that the question or
matter before the official necessitate “a formal exercise of
24. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365 (quoting § 201).
25. Id. (quoting McDonnell v. United States, 792 F.3d 478, 505 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d,
136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016)).
26. Id.; see § 201(a)(3).
27. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2366.
28. Id. at 2367.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2366.
31. Id. The trial court instead gave the jury the prosecution’s preferred instruction:
that an official act “encompassed ‘acts that a public official customarily performs,’
including acts ‘in furtherance of longer-term goals’ or ‘in a series of steps to exercise
influence or achieve an end.’” Id. (citation omitted).
32. Id. at 2367.
33. See id. at 2367–68.
34. Id. at 2368 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2012)).
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governmental power” in order to resolve it.35 Accordingly, the Court
found that McDonnell’s act of arranging “typical” meetings outside
the context of formal proceedings did not satisfy the first element.36
Second, although it found that three of the governor’s actions did
meet the first official act element,37 the Court held that arranging a
meeting, hosting an event, or contacting another government official
does not sufficiently constitute making a decision or taking action,
which is necessary for the second element.38 It explained that the
purpose of these actions was only to discuss a study or to gather
additional information about Williams’s product, not to “make a
decision.”39 The Court held that those actions can be “evidence of an
agreement to take an official act,” but, standing alone, do not
constitute an official act.40
The idea of McDonnell’s actions constituting a crime troubled
the Court. The justices feared that treating his actions as official
actions would be a slippery slope, such that a public official could face
criminal charges for helping any constituent with her troubles if that
constituent had given the official some donation or benefit.41 This
slippery slope could make public officials less responsive to their
electorate and citizens less willing to engage with their
representatives, which would warp “the basic compact underlying
representative government.” 42 In the end, the Court decided its
“concern [was] not with tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball
gowns,” but rather the harmful impact that may occur from upholding
the convictions.43
35. Id. at 2372.
36. Id. at 2368.
37. Id. at 2369–70. The three “questions or matters” which satisfied the first element
were:
(1) ‘whether researchers at any of Virginia’s state universities would initiate a
study of Anatabloc’; (2) ‘whether the state-created Tobacco Indemnification and
Community Revitalization Commission’ would ‘allocate grant money for the study
of anatabine’; and (3) ‘whether the health insurance plan for state employees in
Virginia would include Anatabloc as a covered drug.’
Id. at 2370 (quoting McDonnell v. United States, 792 F.3d 478, 515–16 (4th Cir. 2015),
rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016)).
38. See id. at 2371.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2371–72 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 2372 (“The Government’s position could cast a pall of potential prosecution
over these relationships if the union had given a campaign contribution in the past or the
homeowners invited the official to join them on their annual outing to the ballgame.”).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2375.
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II. THE PROBLEM WITH THE “FERRARIS, ROLEXES, AND BALL
GOWNS”
In McDonnell, the Court sought to protect representative
democracy and the public’s confidence that its government will be
responsive to the public interest.44 However, the Court’s decision
actually harms what it aimed to protect. Most Americans already
question their government’s honesty and true intentions behind its
decisions, and this ruling will only further undermine the public’s trust
in its government. Further, McDonnell hinders representative
democracy. It protects an activity—influencing public officials, at
least subconsciously, by giving them lavish gifts—that is unnecessary
and inappropriate in the American political process.
A. The Court’s Incorrect Perception of Public Opinion
By saying its “concern is not with tawdry tales of Ferraris,
Rolexes, and ball gowns,”45 the Court demonstrated its disconnect
from the public’s opinion. This statement follows a pattern of
Supreme Court Justices believing that public officials accepting lavish
gifts and large campaign contributions will not affect their decision
making or the public’s trust.46 As the Court notoriously stated in
Citizens United v. FEC,47 “[t]he appearance of influence or access . . .
will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.” 48
However, this belief is misguided. Four in five Americans already do
not trust the government, and roughly three in four Americans
believe that public officials “put [their] own interests ahead of [the]
country’s.”49 Further, this degree of distrust is not new—Americans
have felt this way for the past ten years.50 These troubling beliefs and
patterns may be rooted in the fact that most people believe the
44. See id. at 2372.
45. Id. at 2375.
46. See Jacob Eisler, McDonnell and Anti-Corruption’s Last Stand, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1619, 1634 (2017) (“The [McDonnell] Court’s treatment of [public] official
corruption narrowed the range of political behavior classified as illicit.”).
47. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
48. Id. at 360. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Citizens United, repeated his
previous stance that this type of “[f]avoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in
representative politics.” Id. at 359 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003)).
49. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., BEYOND DISTRUST: HOW AMERICANS VIEW THEIR
GOVERNMENT 4 (2015), http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/11/11-23-2015-Governance
-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/FY9K-S6WP].
50. See Samantha Smith, 6 Key Takeaways About How Americans View Their
Government, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015
/11/23/6-key-takeaways-about-how-americans-view-their-government/ [https://perma.cc
/VXC2-D37Q].
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biggest problem with elected federal officials is that they are
“[i]nfluenced by special interest money” or are “[c]orrupt.”51 Almost
seventy-five percent of Americans believe that these officials do not
care what their constituents think anymore, almost a twenty percent
increase since 2000.52 The United States has not experienced a tenyear stretch of this level of skepticism in fifty years.53
McDonnell’s facts and holding reinforce why most Americans
view the federal government as corrupt and not responsive to the
public will. Consider the relationship in McDonnell—a drug
company’s CEO gained access to a governor through a steady stream
of extravagant gifts, and the governor subsequently strongly
advocated for the CEO’s product.54 No honest version of those facts
can conceal the perception of impropriety that the relationship raises.
Even the Supreme Court acknowledged “[t]here is no doubt that this
case is distasteful; it may be worse than that.”55 The public is likely to
view McDonnell as the Supreme Court unanimously permitting—and
implicitly supporting—a state’s highest public officer maintaining
distasteful and tawdry relationships like this. In fact, Virginia officials
went as far to say that “the public’s confidence was shaken in the
wake of [McDonnell’s] conviction in federal court.”56
Virginia’s government attempted to restore the public’s
confidence by imposing new gift restrictions for its public officials,57
but the federal government has taken no such step for federal
officials. Its inaction suggests that the federal government is relying
on McDonnell’s argument, that upholding McDonnell’s convictions
would somehow lessen the public’s faith in the government. 58
However, the data show this belief is a fallacy. 59 Given the
51. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 49, at 194.
52. See Smith, supra note 50.
53. See id.; PEW RESEARCH CTR., GOVERNMENT GETS LOWER RATINGS FOR
HANDLING HEALTH CARE, ENVIRONMENT, DISASTER RESPONSE 1 (2017),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/12/14104805/12-14-17-Government
-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DB8-59B3] (“Public trust in government . . . remains close
to a historic low. Just 18% say they trust the federal government to do the right thing ‘just
about always’ or ‘most of the time’ – a figure that has changed very little for more than a
decade.”).
54. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2362–64 (2016).
55. Id. at 2375.
56. Patrick Wilson, Virginia Lawmakers Approve New Gift Limit Rules, VIRGINIANPILOT (Apr. 18, 2015), http://pilotonline.com/news/government/politics/virginia/virginialawmakers-approve-new-gift-limit-rules/article_3bf297a7-ac6b-5501-884b-20cc62733a51.html
[https://perma.cc/78UK-85DW] (quoting Del. Todd Gilbert (R-Shenandoah County)).
57. See id.
58. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
59. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
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aforementioned public belief that the government acts only in the
special interests of large benefactors, the tawdry tales and outcome of
McDonnell will only exacerbate the public’s distrust in government.
B.

Distinguishing Preferential Access to Public Officials from
Elections

Critics of McDonnell argue that wealthy individuals may now
permissibly give gifts to public officials in order to gain access or
potentially guide their political decisions. 60 McDonnell supporters
respond to this criticism by arguing that this type of access to public
officials is indistinguishable from campaign contributions.61 However,
60. See Arlo Devlin-Brown & Stephen Dee, Introduction: The Shifting Sands of
Public Corruption, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 979, 987 (2017) (“Read alongside the Court’s
campaign finance decisions, a picture is presented of a political reality in which money for
access is normal and even an essential feature of a political system in which donations to
political campaigns are protected speech.”); Eisler, supra note 46, at 1641 (“By describing
McDonnell’s conduct as prospectively constituent service rather than unequivocally an
instance of bribery, the Court implies a characterization of politicians as the pawns of
whichever constituent can offer the strongest incentives to take a particular course of
action.”); Randall D. Eliason, McDonnell v. United States: A Cramped Vision of Public
Corruption, GEO. WASH. L. REV.: ON THE DOCKET (July 2, 2016), http://www.gwlr.org
/mcdonnell-v-united-states-a-cramped-vision-of-public-corruption/ [https://perma.cc/E5KY6MX8] (“As a result [of McDonnell], those with the means to make substantial personal
gifts to a politician may now legally obtain access to the corridors of power that is
unavailable to everyday citizens.”).
This negative perception is tempered by the presence of gift restrictions. In
addition to prohibitions on bribery, the federal government, and many state governments,
have gift restrictions. See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 114-192, at 973–1001 (2017) (describing gift
restrictions covering members of the House); S. DOC. NO. 113-18, at 46–56 (2013) (setting
out gift restrictions covering members of the Senate); 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.201–.206 (2017)
(detailing gift restrictions covering employees of the federal executive branch); Legislator
Gift Restrictions Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research
/ethics/50-state-table-gift-laws.aspx (last updated Nov. 7, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3X2L9RB3] (outlining each state’s gift restrictions, if applicable, for state legislators). However,
these rules have many exceptions. See, e.g., BRYAN KAPPE & PRATEEK REDDY, PUB.
CITIZEN, GIFT RULES FOR THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 1–3 (2011), https://www.citizen.org
/documents/Gift-Rules-Executive-Branch.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8PFE-BJQS];
PUB.
CITIZEN, GIFT RULES FOR CONGRESS 3–6 (2007), https://www.citizen.org/documents/GiftRules-for-Congress.pdf [https://perma.cc/LAR5-XCW7]. Consequently, unsightly gifts
may still be legally permissible. Further, the public would have to be generally aware of
these gift restrictions, and their exceptions, to fully dispel this negative perception, which
is unlikely.
61. George D. Brown, The Federal Anti-Corruption Enterprise After McDonnell—
Lessons from the Symposium, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 989, 993–98 (2017) (evaluating amicus
briefs supporting McDonnell and finding some arguing the gifts provided to McDonnell
were permissible campaign contributions or political speech); David Debold, Symposium:
An Important Victory for Representative Democracy, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2016, 2:50
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-an-important-victory-forrepresentative-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/FG44-68YW] (“The danger of [including
access in the definition of official act] . . . starts with the fact that the ‘quid’ in a quid pro
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campaign contributions are easily distinguishable from gifts to public
officials. Campaign contributions are more regulated, more limited in
value, and more common than gifts given directly to public officials.
Consequently, campaign contributions’ ability to influence a public
official’s decision making pales in comparison to unregulated gifts
given outside of the campaign context.
There are some reasonable comparisons between campaign
contributions and gifts to public officials. Both often give the donor
special access to the public official. During political campaigns,
candidates host fundraisers where donors typically contribute a
certain amount according to the event’s donation hierarchy. 62
Accordingly, the higher a donor is in the hierarchy, the more access
she has to the candidate during the event, such as a special cocktail
reception or personal one-on-one time with the candidate. 63 In
addition to access at these events, the candidate’s largest contributors
could have other ways to share their thoughts and ideas, such as by
regularly scheduled meetings or telephone calls. Ultimately, one
could argue these campaign events and special perks for prominent
donors are equivalent to paying for additional access. Thus, if access
related to significant campaign contributions is already permitted,
then individuals seeking a meeting with a public official during his or
her busy schedule should be given the same ability to get access.64
However, access related to campaign contributions is different in
nature and effect than access related to gifts given to public officials.
Unlike gifts, campaign contributions are heavily regulated. Persons
can only give $2,700 per election to candidates for federal office and
only $5,000 each calendar year to political action committees

quo prosecution can be a perfectly lawful thing of value, ranging from campaign
contributions to something as mundane as a meal reimbursement at the local diner.”);
Pete Patterson & John Ohlendorf, Symposium: Federal Prosecutors and the Power to Pick
Defendants, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2016, 10:37 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06
/symposium-federal-prosecutors-and-the-power-to-pick-defendants/ [https://perma.cc/L372QFLK] (arguing that a narrower definition of official act is needed because “it is relatively
easy for the government to prove that an official accepted something of value” like a
campaign contribution or access).
62. See, e.g., EMILY’S LIST, MAKING THE DOUGH RISE: A MANUAL FOR
CAMPAIGN FUNDRAISERS 36, 38 (2004), https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Making
%20the%20Dough%20Rise.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RUH-TNDR]. For example, a
campaign fundraiser may have donor levels like sponsors, hosts, and co-hosts. See id. at 39.
63. See id. at 20, 39.
64. See Brown, supra note 61, at 993–98 (evaluating amicus briefs supporting
McDonnell and finding some arguing the gifts provided to McDonnell were permissible
campaign contributions or political speech).
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(“PACs”), which may directly support the candidate.65 In addition, all
significant campaign contributions are publicly reported, such that
interested parties can follow the money flowing to candidates.66 Gifts,
on the other hand, are effectively uncapped because of the numerous
gift exceptions.67 Further, public officials do not always have to report
gifts they have received, especially if they were not from lobbyists.68
Thus, while these two paths to access may appear similar on the
surface, in reality, our laws treat campaign contributions and gifts to
public officials quite differently.
These regulatory distinctions between campaign contributions
and gifts to public officials are meaningful. First, the $7,700 federal
campaign contribution ceiling is a much lower total than the $175,000
in benefits that Williams gave Governor McDonnell.69 Although not
65. Citizens’ Guide, FED. ELECTION COMM’N http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures
/citizens.shtml# [https://perma.cc/6QDY-ZDGX]. Although individuals may donate an
unlimited amount of money to a “Super PAC,” those groups likely cannot provide the
donor the same level of special access because “Super PACs are required to operate
independently of the candidates they support.” COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, FORMING
AND OPERATING SUPER PACS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR POLITICAL CONSULTANTS IN
2016, at 4 (2016), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2016/05/forming
_and_operating_super_pacs_a_practical_guide_for_political_consultants_in_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZNW5-FCD9]. Most states—but not all—also cap campaign and PAC
contributions. NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, STATE LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS
TO CANDIDATES: 2017-2018 ELECTION CYCLE (2017), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1
/Documents/Elections/Contribution_Limits%20_to_Candidates_%202017-2018_16465.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2SS8-24NS] (noting eleven states, including Virginia, who do not cap
campaign and PAC contributions).
66. See Citizens’ Guide, supra note 65. All contributions to candidates’ campaigns are
publicly available, and all political committees must report donations which exceed $200.
See id. This is especially important in states, like McDonnell’s home state of Virginia, that
do not limit campaign contributions. See NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note
65.
67. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-212(f) (2017); H.R. Doc. No. 114-192, at 982–87
(2017); H.R. Doc. No. 113-18, at 47–50 (2013); 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204 (2017). For further
discussion of gift restrictions, see supra note 60.
68. See NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 60 (“Many states place the
greatest restrictions on gifts from lobbyists to legislators.”); Personal Financial Disclosure:
Gift and Honorarium Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org
/research/ethics/personal-financial-disclosure-gift-and-honoraria.aspx
[https://perma.cc
/49TZ-EKDS] (last updated June 1, 2014) (outlining the varied disclosure requirements
states have adopted and finding such requirements in only 36 states).
69. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2363–64 (2016) (describing the
gifts McDonnell received). Although Williams could have legally donated an equivalent
amount of cash to McDonnell’s campaign because Virginia does not cap campaign
contributions, most states have campaign contribution limits similar to the federal one. See
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 65; see also 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a) (2016);
Price Index Adjustments for Contributions and Expenditure Limitations, 82 Fed. Reg.
10904, 10905–06 (Feb. 16, 2017). In addition, the other arguments below for why campaign
contributions are different than gifts apply to McDonnell’s facts. See infra notes 71–82 and
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all Americans can afford to donate $7,700 to a candidate, many more
can give that amount versus Williams’s giving. If more people donate
the maximum contribution amount—and many do70—the value of the
access to the candidate during elections is diluted.
Second, the limited, or sometimes non-existent, gift-reporting
requirements make it more difficult for the public to evaluate how
their government representatives may be being influenced.71 Perhaps
even more importantly, this lack of information prevents state ethics
commissions and prosecutors from monitoring public officials and
holding them accountable for potential corruption.72 This distinction
is especially important in states that do not limit campaign
contributions.73 Although individuals in these states can attempt to
influence public officials through both lavish campaign contributions
and gifts, the public can find out about the lavish campaign
contributions because of their reporting requirements.74 The same is
not true for gifts because of their more lax reporting requirements.75
Third, public officials may implicitly attribute different meanings
to campaign contributions and personal gifts. During a campaign,
officials are constantly attending fundraisers and are receiving
numerous donations. Each donation may not feel as special or
important. Conversely, once the official is in office, and the steady
stream of generosity diminishes, their judgment and ability to remain
impartial could be more tested by gifts. These varying perceptions are
further bolstered by the fact that public officials use campaign
accompanying text. Further, the dilution argument, see infra note 70 and accompanying
text, also applies to states that allow unlimited campaign contributions since multiple highdollar donors are competing for access to their donees.
70. According to the FEC, roughly 482,000 individual contributors gave at least $2,700
to political candidates or organizations during the 2015-2016 election cycle—and that’s just
for federal elections. Individual Contributions, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
https://www.fec.gov/data/receipts/individual-contributions/ (filter for 2015–16 under
“Transaction Time Period” and more than $2,700 under “Contribution Amount”). About
72,000 gave at least $7,700 or more. Individual Contributions, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
https://www.fec.gov/data/receipts/individual-contributions/ (filter for 2015–16 under
“Transaction Time Period” and more than $7,700 under “Contribution Amount”).
71. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Campaign contributions have more
stringent reporting requirements, see Citizens’ Guide, supra note 65, so ethics commissions
and prosecutors are better able to use those reports to identify and address corrupt
behavior.
73. See generally NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 65 (listing the states
that do not have campaign contribution limits).
74. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. For a discussion of why almost every
campaign contribution can be identified, despite efforts to obfuscate a donor’s identity and
donation amount, see infra note 81.
75. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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donations and gifts differently. Donations to politician’s campaign go
directly to the campaign and can only be used for limited purposes,
like advertising and travel. 76 The politician cannot convert these
donations to personal use.77 Gifts, on the other hand, go directly to
the official and are fully at the official’s disposal for personal
enjoyment. As a result, these differences mean that gifts likely have a
greater effect than campaign contributions, so they should not be
perceived as the same.
Lastly, the final flaw in the argument that all preferential access
is the same is the difference in donors’ intent. Campaign contributors
may have mixed motivations for their donations. A campaign
contributor, even if he gives with the intent to bribe the official, can at
least say his donation went toward a legitimate purpose, such as
helping elect leaders who share their values. 78 However, as one
scholar points out, “secret gifts to a politician have no legitimate or
legally recognized purpose and automatically have the whiff of
corruption about them.” 79 In fact, the true similarity between
campaign contributions and gifts is how the law treats a donor’s bad
intentions. Even in Citizens United, when the Court notoriously
opened the door for more money to enter politics, the majority
opinion stated that campaign contributions can lead to bribery
convictions, based on the donor’s corrupt intentions. 80 Although
identifying a campaign contributor’s intent may be difficult, at least
the contributor’s identity and donation amount are most likely public
information.81 The same cannot be said for gifts.82 Consequently, gifts
76. See 52 U.S.C. § 30114(a) (2016) (describing “permitted uses” of campaign
contributions); Personal Use, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/helpcandidates-and-committees/making-disbursements/personal-use/ [https://perma.cc/H8HM97E4] (offering examples of permissible uses of campaign contributions).
77. See § 30114(b) (prohibiting “personal use” of campaign contributions); Personal
Use, supra note 76 (distinguishing between and providing examples of prohibited personal
and permissible non-personal uses of campaign contributions).
78. See Randall D. Eliason, Selling Access: Trump and the Legacy of Bob McDonnell,
LAW360 (Jan. 26, 2016, 1:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/885088/selling-accesstrump-and-the-legacy-of-bob-mcdonnell/ [https://perma.cc/X72L-7W36 (staff-uploaded
archive)]; see also Michael Barber, Donation Motivations: Testing Theories of Access and
Ideology, 69 POL. RES. Q. 148, 154 (2016) (detailing the various reasons people donate to
political campaigns).
79. See Eliason, supra note 78.
80. Citizen’s United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010).
81. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. A campaign contributor could avoid her
identity being attached to the donation by donating to a candidate through a company’s
PAC. However, these types of contributions are unlikely to be intended, or at least
unlikely to be effective, as bribes. First, for an individual to make a successful bribe, she
needs to show the official the commitment she made in order for the official to act in a
certain way. If her name is not attached to a specific donation, it would be difficult for the
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do not share the same importance or impact in the political process,
so the Court should treat them differently.
III. WHERE THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DRAWN THE LINE
The Court’s constrained view of bribery led it to insert
unwarranted policy concerns into its opinion. Instead of evaluating
the confluence of all bribery elements, the Court made it seem as if a
conviction solely rested on the “official act” element.83 If that were
actually the case, its policy concerns may have been warranted. An
“official act,” however, is just one of five elements of bribery.84
Instead of focusing so much on the “official act” element, the Court
should have focused on bribery’s mens rea element to ensure
ordinary political participation does not constitute bribery. As a
result, the Court in McDonnell misconstrued these public corruption
statutes and created troubling precedent.
A. Improper Use of the Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine
The McDonnell decision’s concern with a broader definition of
an official act resembled the Court avoiding a constitutional question.
public official to know that the briber has upheld her end of the bargain. Second, even if
someone created a shell corporation to funnel donations to a candidate as a way to keep
the donor’s identity out of the campaign contribution disclosures, this effort would most
likely not prevent the public from still identifying the donor. Someone looking to identify
the people behind a corporation or LLC’s large political donation could simply identify
the registered organization’s home state and then view that registered organization’s
public documents to ascertain the people behind the donation. Thus, the donor would still
risk her bribe being identified. Third, even if the donor attempted to bribe a politician by
donating to a related nonprofit organization usually not required to disclose their donor’s
identities, 26 C.F.R. § 301.6104(b)(1) (2017), the donor nonetheless faces significant
challenges. Those groups’ activity face even greater restrictions than Super PACs—they
cannot coordinate their efforts with the candidates they support, and political activity
cannot be the majority of the organization’s expenditures nor its primary purpose. See
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360 (“By definition, an independent expenditure is political
speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate.”). See
generally B. HOLLY SCHADLER, BOLDER ADVOCACY, THE CONNECTION: STRATEGIES
FOR
CREATING AND OPERATING 501(C)(3)S, 501(C)(4)S AND POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 2012), https://www.bolderadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012
/10/The_Connection_paywall.pdf [https://perma.cc/X26B-SMGK] (detailing federal
requirements for and restrictions on political activity by 501(c)(4) and similar groups). As
a result, these significant challenges mitigate the risk that a donor could successfully bribe
a public official and go undetected by the public, and law enforcement, by using the above
methods.
82. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
83. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2325, 2367 (providing multiple
elements of bribery and Hobbs Act extortion but only addressing the ‘official act’ element
in the offenses).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (defining the crime of bribery).
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As a general practice, the Court makes every effort to determine a
case on statutory grounds without ever reaching the constitutional
issue.85 The Court seemingly invoked this doctrine when it questioned
how the government’s broader definition of official act would affect
the political process.86 When doing so, the Court noted “significant
constitutional concerns” with a broader definition, but it never
explicitly explained what those concerns were. 87 Justice Roberts,
writing for the unanimous Court, said “that public officials will hear
from their constituents and act appropriately on their concerns,” and
“conscientious public officials arrange meetings for constituents,
contact other officials on their behalf, and include them in events all
the time.” 88 He argued that the government’s construction could
make officials “wonder whether they could respond to even the most
commonplace requests for assistance, and citizens with legitimate
concerns might shrink from participating in democratic discourse.”89
Doing so would undermine “[t]he basic compact underlying
representative government.”90
However, the Court was misguided in believing that the type of
preferential access is part of “[t]he basic compact” of our
democracy.91 The Court rightfully should want to protect common
constituent services, but the relationship between Johnnie Williams
and Governor McDonnell was not a typical constituent-public official
relationship. The benefits Williams gave Governor McDonnell go far
beyond some de minimis item a constituent may give a public official
as a way of thanking her for her service, like a hot dog at a Memorial
Day cookout. Even if the law does not prohibit the public official
from accepting the gift, it begins to price access to one’s
representative. That practice is a slippery slope.92 Thus, the Court
85. E.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”).
86. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
87. Id.; see Brown, supra note 61, at 1001 (noting that the McDonnell Court did not
explain what its constitutional concerns were but explains the “likely candidates are
federalism and political process concerns”).
88. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Fred Wertheimer, Symposium: McDonnell Decision Substantially Weakens the
Government’s Ability to Prevent Corruption and Protect Citizens, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28,
2016, 12:38 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-mcdonnell-decisionsubstantially-weakens-the-governments-bbility-to-prevent-corruption-and-protectcitizens/ [https://perma.cc/A7G7-TSHY].
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needlessly invoked the constitutional avoidance doctrine when
addressing the issues and should not continue to feel constrained for
these reasons when deciding public corruption issues. Instead, only its
statutory analysis should hold precedential value.93
B.

Using the Mens Rea Element to Protect Constituent Services

The Court could have avoided any apprehension about
undermining the political process by considering the mens rea
element of bribery and other public corruption criminal statutes. To
establish an honest services fraud, Hobbs Act extortion, and/or
bribery charge against a public official, the government must
“establish three legs of a stool: a ‘quid’ (the thing of value provided to
the public official), a ‘quo’ (an official action), and a ‘pro’ (that the
one thing was in exchange for the other).”94 So, for each of these
statutes, including those used to prosecute McDonnell, the
government must prove some intent—that the public official accepted
the benefit knowing he or she would need to do some specific act to
return the favor.95 Analyzing the definition of bribery shows this. To
successfully prosecute a public official for bribery, the government
must prove each of five elements: “(1) a public official (2) with
corrupt intent (3) receives a benefit (4) given with the intent to

93. See Brown, supra note 61, at 1001–03 (noting additional reasons for why
“[r]eading McDonnell as primarily a constitutional case would be a stretch”).
94. Arlo Devlin-Brown & Erin Monju, Public Corruption Prosecutions and Defenses
Post-‘McDonnell’, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal
/almID/1202777763569/public-corruption-prosecutions-and-defenses-postmcdonnell/
[https://perma.cc/2546-DYP4 (staff-uploaded archive)]; see 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012)
(“Whoever . . . being a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or
indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept
anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for: (A) being
influenced in the performance of any official act; (B) being influenced to commit or aid in
committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission
of any fraud, on the United States; or (C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in
violation of the official duty of such official or person”); see also Devlin-Brown & Dee,
supra note 60, at 986 (applying the “stool” concept to hypothetical examples).
95. In McDonnell, the Court specifically viewed the Hobbs Act as requiring the public
official to “know[] that the thing of value was given in return for official action.”
McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. McDonnell, 792
F.3d 478, 505 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2325 (2017)). Honest services fraud requires
proving fraud, so the public official must have had some bad intent when accepting the
money or property. See § 1343; Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010).
Moreover, parties often agree to define honest services fraud with reference to the federal
bribery statute, which is codified at § 201. See, e.g., McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365. This
makes sense in light of the Skilling Court’s decision to interpret honest services fraud as
“encompass[ing] only bribery and kickback schemes.” Skilling, 561 U.S. at 412.
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influence (5) an official act.”96 This “corrupt intent” element is the
mens rea element, as a public official is not guilty of bribery unless
she “corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive
or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or
entity.”97
These public corruption statutory schemes, exemplified by
bribery, show that only public officials with malevolent intentions will
be punished. By using these requirements, Congress demonstrated
that it only sought to punish public officials who actively choose to
follow one individual’s or group’s interests, instead of their
electorate’s interests, because of some benefit the person or group
provided.98 Ordinary constituent services, which the McDonnell Court
feared would be encompassed by a broader definition of official act,99
will not constitute corruption because ordinary services, by their very
nature, are performed without the requisite corrupt intent. If ordinary
constituent services are such an important part of a public official’s
job, as the Court argued,100 a public official providing these services
alone would not satisfy the mens rea element.
In addition, because these constituent services are so important,
it does not make sense to effectively exempt them from corruption

96. The Supreme Court, 2015 Term–Leading Cases, 130 HARV. L. REV. 467, 473
(2016) (delineating 18 U.S.C. § 201’s definition of bribery into five elements).
97. § 201(b)(2) (emphasis added).
98. This argument does not suggest that public officials should always follow the will
of the majority of the electorate. American history demonstrates the danger of following
only the will of the majority, especially as it relates to minority groups’ rights. See
Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1164 (1977)
(stating that the concern that the majority will disregard minority interests when exercising
power is as old as the nation and democracy itself). See generally ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Eduardo Nolla ed., James T. Schleifer trans.,
2010) (1835) (outlining how American majoritarian rule could compromise the
fundamental rights of minorities); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Rule of Law and the
Judicial Function in the World Today, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1383 (2014) (noting a
study showing that America, compared to other countries, “‘lag[s] behind’ for failing to
provide disadvantaged persons access to the legal system” and explaining that the
American political process “has a way of becoming tyrannical, reflecting little more than
the arbitrary will of a simple majority, perfectly willing to run roughshod over the
desires—and, indeed, the rights—of the unfavored minority”). Also, a minority argument
can be more persuasive to a public official without the minority party providing the official
some benefit. Rather, the mens rea element targets situations where public officials take a
certain action or position because of a personal gain which stems from taking that
position.
99. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
100. See id.
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laws. Yet that is exactly what the Court seems to suggest. 101 If
constituent services are indeed part of “[t]he basic compact
underlying representative government,”102 the law should ensure that
constituents can get these services without having to give the public
official some benefit. If corruption laws are not applied to ordinary
constituent services, public officials could require a payment or
service in exchange for assisting with a constituent’s passport request,
disability insurance case, or Veterans Affairs claim for life-changing
medical care. That scenario would put a price on representation,
which does not seem to comport with American representative
democracy. Consequently, focusing on public officials’ intent when
they act in exchange for some benefit would better ensure a more
responsive democracy as opposed to narrowing the definition of
official act. It also would more directly address the public’s
overwhelming concern that their public officials do not act in the
electorate’s interest.103 Instead of using a head-scratching, highly factspecific definition of an official act, courts can protect the political
process by faithfully applying the mens rea element of public
corruption statutes.104
Utilizing the mens rea element in this gatekeeper fashion does
raise some challenges. Although Congress demonstrated that it only
wanted to punish public officials who acted “corruptly,” it did not
define “corruptly” within the bribery statute.105 Without this statutory
definition, social norms may weigh most heavily in a factfinder’s
determination of when an official “corruptly” acted.106 As a result,

101. See id. (rejecting the Government’s argument that ordinary constituent services—
such as connecting constituents with other public officials—are included in the meaning of
“official act” under § 201).
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
104. Had the McDonnell court relied more on the statute’s mens rea element instead
of the official act element, it may have upheld McDonnell’s conviction. See Eliason, supra
note 60 (“The nature of the gifts themselves was substantial evidence of a corrupt
agreement. . . . By focusing exclusively on the particular trees of McDonnell’s actions
rather than the entire quid pro quo agreement, the Court missed the corrupt forest that
was the relationship between McDonnell and Williams.”).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2012); see Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime,
103 GEO. L.J. 547, 567 (2015). Even in instances where Congress has defined “corruptly,”
the definition uses terms courts have struggled to precisely define, especially as to whether
the official had to consciously disregard the law. Buell, supra, at 566–67 (highlighting
courts’ treatment of corrupt intent under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
106. See Buell, supra note 105, at 551–54, 570 (“[B]ribery is based on the idea of
corruption, which is legally useful not as a formal concept in the air but as a structure for
contextual inquiry into social norms.”). Buell suggests that bribery should be redefined as
“making an offer to give something of value to another for the purpose of influencing that
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different factfinders may understand this term differently, potentially
creating ambiguity in precedent and, subsequently, some
unpredictability.107
Even with these risks, relying more on bribery’s mens rea
element is the better approach for protecting public officials’ ability
to respond to constituents. First, individuals are unlikely to construe
the term “corruptly” so many different ways. At its root, the term
connotes some bad intention. Based on McDonnell, the Court
believes public officials effectively responding to constituents’
concerns is a very good thing,108 so doing so would be far from acting
with bad intentions. This baseline understanding, combined with
bribery’s other four elements, prevents courts from using the mens
rea element as a blank check to convict public officials. Second, the
“official act” element, and especially the McDonnell opinion’s
interpretation of it, creates ambiguity in its own right.109 Although the
Court provide some examples of the new definition—“a decision or
action on a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’
. . . involv[ing] a formal exercise of governmental power”110—each of
the three major parts of this definition is susceptible to different
interpretations. Instead of giving juries one potentially ambiguous
term—corrupt intent—to construe, the McDonnell approach instead
asks juries to interpret three potentially ambiguous parts of just one of
the five elements of bribery. Thus, the McDonnell approach likely
creates even more unpredictability. As a result, greater reliance on
bribery’s mens rea element is a better way to protect the country’s
political process and representative democracy.
IV. COURTS MOVING FORWARD FROM MCDONNELL
McDonnell’s impact will be difficult to measure. It will likely
affect prosecutors’ decision to move forward with public corruption

person’s performance of an official or fiduciary function in a manner known to be
wrongfully influenced.” Id. at 596.
107. Commentators frequently attack this sort of statutory vagueness especially in the
criminal context, arguing that it gives the government too much discretion. See, e.g.,
Harvey A. Silverglate & Emma Quinn-Judge, Tawdry or Corrupt? McDonnell Fails to
Draw a Clear Line for Federal Prosecution of State Officials, 2015–2016 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 189, 218–19 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court should invalidate honest
services fraud because it is unconstitutionally vague).
108. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016); see supra notes 88–
90 and accompanying text.
109. Silverglate & Quinn-Judge, supra note 107, at 204–05 (“[T]he Court’s application
of this standard immediately muddies the waters.”).
110. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371–72 (quoting § 201(a)(3)).
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investigations, but prosecutorial calculus is not usually broadcast
publicly.111 As a result, the only reliable way to measure the decision’s
impact will be to evaluate how courts apply McDonnell to different
sets of facts. Only minimal takeaways can be reasonably gleaned from
recent lower court decisions, so future cases are necessary to develop
the scope of McDonnell. Even then, McDonnell’s fact-specific
limitations may blur any takeaways from courts’ treatment of the
case.112
A. Courts’ Application of McDonnell
The Court’s decision in McDonnell led many defendants to
appeal their prior convictions or to move to dismiss their indictment,
hoping that they may receive a new trial with updated jury
instructions. 113 Several commentators predicted that McDonnell
would not have a significant impact on corruption charges and
convictions, 114 and district courts’ rulings on cases pending when
111. When prosecutors choose to not pursue a conviction because of McDonnell’s
official act requirements, it will be up to journalists to uncover “tawdry tales” and then
analyze those facts, which may be without the full context of the situation. However, one
measurable impact on prosecutors could be heightened pleading standards. A district
judge is currently deciding whether McDonnell requires prosecutors to identify specific
official acts in a defendant’s indictment, or whether McDonnell only affects jury
instructions. See William Gorta, Feds Say UN Bribery Suspect Started ‘Interrogation’,
LAW360 (Feb. 28, 2017, 9:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/896674/feds-say-unbribery-suspect-started-interrogation
[https://perma.cc/Y7NE-6LBW
(staff-uploaded
archive)].
One former federal prosecutor, writing as a co-author, does not think McDonnell
will greatly affect prosecutors when they decide whether to charge a public official with
corruption crimes. See Devlin-Brown & Dee, supra note 60, at 985–86 (“The reality is that
McDonnell only precludes prosecutions where the government’s theory is that the public
official agreed to provide preferential access rather than an actual exercise of
governmental power. However, prosecutors do not usually bring cases alleging that mere
official access was the only goal of the corrupt scheme. Instead, prosecutors allege that the
corrupt scheme involved at least the intended exercise of governmental power to benefit
the briber payer, regardless of whether the scheme was ultimately successful.”).
112. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (describing how the Court applied
its new narrow definition of official act only to meetings between McDonnell and other
public officials).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, No. 17-3868, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 25061, at *1–3
(6th Cir. Dec. 12, 2017); United States v. Skelos, 707 Fed. App’x 733, 736 (2d Cir. 2017);
United States v. Tavares, 844 F.3d 46, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Chapman,
No. 16-199-01, 02, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8483, at *9 n.24 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2017); United
States v. Vederman, 225 F. Supp. 3d 308, 310–11 (E.D. Pa. 2016); United States v. Reed,
No. 15-100, 2016 WL 6946983, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 28, 2016).
114. See Devlin-Brown & Monju, supra note 94 (explaining that “McDonnell is of
limited significance” and would only bar “the weakest of public corruption cases”); The
Supreme Court, 2015 Term Leading Cases, supra note 96, at 467 (listing a number of
“qualifications” that “reduce the likelihood that the decision will hamper future

96 N.C. L. REV. 1175 (2018)

2018]

MCDONNELL AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION

1195

McDonnell was decided have generally supported those
predictions.115
However, appellate courts, and district courts on motions for
release pending appeal, have been more generous when considering
appeals on these grounds. Several have decided that the McDonnellbased appeals raised a substantial question.116 For example, in United
States v. Tavares,117 the First Circuit used McDonnell’s official act
construction to reverse the defendant’s Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) conviction, which was based on
nine violations of a Massachusetts gratuities statute. 118 The
Massachusetts statute at issue requires an “official act,” so the court
applied the McDonnell interpretation.119 The First Circuit then relied
on the second element of McDonnell’s official act standard, which
requires acting on a specific question.120 Although the evidence may
have shown that the defendant appointed individuals to jobs because
a legislator told him to do so, the court did not find that the legislator
returned the favor—taking some official act based on the defendant’s
request.121 The First Circuit reasoned that the defendant’s acts looked
more like “building up ‘a reservoir of goodwill,’” and that alone “is
not sufficient to show a specific public act” under McDonnell.122

prosecutions”). But see Wertheimer, supra note 92 (expressing concerns that the Court’s
decision “substantially weakened the legal protections that currently exist against
government corruption”).
115. See, e.g., Chapman, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8483, at *9 n.24 (rejecting the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the honest services fraud charge but noting that
McDonnell’s construction of “official act” would be used); United States v. Lee, No.
1:15CR445, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174984, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2016) (denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss charges on theory that the alleged acts were not official
acts); Reed, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163275, at *19 (denying McDonnell’s application to the
defendant’s case because statutes for which the defendant allegedly violated—wire fraud
and money laundering—did not contain the words “official act”).
116. Tavares, 844 F.3d at 54; Vederman, 225 F. Supp. 3d at 311 (finding McDonnell’s
changes raised enough of a substantial question in conviction over scheme where
defendants tried to get one an ambassadorship and hire another’s girlfriend to
congressional staff). In Vederman, defendant’s motion for release pending appeal was
granted. Vederman, 225 F. Supp. 3d at 311. This court clearly valued the issue, too, as it did
not grant a co-defendant’s motion because he failed to raise this issue. See United States v.
Fattah, 224 F. Supp. 3d 443, 449 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
117. 844 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2016).
118. Id. at 54.
119. See id. at 56–57.
120. See id. at 57–58.
121. Id. at 58.
122. Id. (quoting United States v. Sun–Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 405
(1999)).
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The Second Circuit has been the most active circuit court in
adjudicating McDonnell-based appeals, serving as a guidepost for
McDonnell’s impact on public corruption law.123 In 2017, the court
issued three decisions in federal cases involving corruption
convictions of state public officials.124 Each of these cases was decided
before McDonnell, so the defendants, on appeal, argued that the jury
which convicted them may have relied on jury instructions or facts
that did not satisfy McDonnell’s narrower definition of official act.125
The Second Circuit upheld one corruption conviction126 but vacated
and remanded the other two convictions.127 In each case, the appeals
court closely examined the trial court’s jury instructions.128 In United
States v. Boyland,129 the court—and the prosecution—acknowledged
that some of the jury instructions “were erroneous in light of
McDonnell,” but the court nonetheless upheld the conviction.130 It
pointed out that the defendant did not object to these jury
instructions during trial,131 and the court reasoned that these errors
did not “affect[] Boyland’s substantial rights” because the official’s
actions—getting approval from city and state governments for
permits, licenses, grants, and other favors—clearly satisfied

123. Some practitioners expect McDonnell to have the biggest impact in the Second
Circuit because of how active the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New
York has been in bringing corruption cases. See The Second Circuit Clarifies Corruption
Standards Following Supreme Court’s McDonnell Decision, ALERT MEMORANDUM
(Cleary Gottlieb, New York, N.Y.), July 20, 2017, at 2, https://www.clearygottlieb.com
/~/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/2017/publications/alert-memos/second-circuit-clarifies
-corruption-standards-7-21-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B6R-WJ2X] (“The McDonnell
decision potentially stands to have its largest impact in the Second Circuit, which had
previously taken a broad view of official acts, and has seen numerous federal public
corruption prosecutions in the last several years—including the convictions of 14 New
York State legislators in the past 10 years alone.”).
124. United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279, 282 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Silver,
864 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x 733, 735–36 (2d Cir.
2017); see Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan Sack, Limits on the Scope of Honest Services
Fraud, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/sites
/newyorklawjournal/2017/11/06/limits-on-the-scope-of-honest-services-fraud/ [https://perma.cc
/C3DG-X6M8 (staff-uploaded archive)] (analyzing the impact of McDonnell and
McDonnell-based appeals in the Second Circuit on honest services fraud law).
125. Boyland, 862 F.3d at 281–82; Silver, 864 F.3d at 105–06; Skelos, 707 F. App’x at
736.
126. Boyland, 862 F.3d at 282.
127. Silver, 864 F.3d at 106; Skelos, 707 F. App’x at 736.
128. Boyland, 862 F.3d at 287; Silver, 864 F.3d at 112; Skelos, 707 F. App’x at 736.
129. 862 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2017).
130. Id. at 288.
131. Id.
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McDonnell’s definition of official act.132 Conversely, in United States
v. Silver133 and United States v. Skelos,134 the Second Circuit found the
opposite to be true.135 In both cases, the defendants objected to the
jury instructions at trial, and the court found that jury instructions,
now erroneous because of McDonnell’s new definition of official act,
could have led the jury to convict the defendants for conduct that is
lawful under McDonnell.136 However, the court in both cases rejected
the defendants’ arguments that the prosecution lacked sufficient
evidence to garner a conviction, resulting in the court only vacating
the convictions as opposed to reversing them.137 As a result, it opened
the door for the government to retry the cases, and the United States
Attorney’s Office is currently in the process of doing just that.138
More decisions like Tavares and these Second Circuit cases are
needed to draw proper conclusions about how courts will treat
McDonnell. 139 Circuit courts are now hearing McDonnell-based
132. Id. at 291–92 (“In sum, all of Boyland’s dealings . . . involved concrete matters
that, in order to proceed, needed to be brought before public officials or agencies that
would have to make formal and focused administrative decisions. . . . Although the jury
was not instructed as to its need to find that the matters were concrete, that they required
focused governmental decisions, and that Boyland took action on these matters, we see no
reasonable possibility, in light of the record as a whole, that that flaw affected the outcome
of the case.”).
133. 864 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2017).
134. 707 F. App’x 733 (2d Cir. 2017).
135. Silver, 864 F.3d at 106; Skelos, 707 F. App’x at 736.
136. Silver, 864 F.3d at 119 (“[W]e cannot conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a
rational jury would have found Silver guilty if it had been properly instructed on the
definition of an official act. While the Government presented evidence of acts that remain
“official” under McDonnell, the jury may have convicted Silver for conduct that is not
unlawful, and a properly instructed jury might have reached a different conclusion.”);
Skelos, 707 F. App’x at 737 (“When we consider the defective jury charge together with
these arguments and the lack of instruction cautioning the jury that a meeting
is not official action, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt ‘that a rational jury
would have found the defendant[s] guilty absent the error.’” (quoting Silver, 864 F.3d at
119)).
137. Silver, 864 F.3d at 106; Skelos, 707 F. App’x at 736.
138. See Elizabeth Rosner & Kaja Whitehouse, Dean Skelos and His Son Get New
Trial Date in Corruption Case, N.Y. POST (Oct. 31, 2017, 4:02 PM), https://nypost.com
/2017/10/31/dean-skelos-and-his-son-get-new-trial-date-in-corruption-case/ [https://perma.cc
/MQ9R-456X].
139. All interested parties lost a great opportunity to clarify this standard when the
government decided to not retry McDonnell’s case. Amy Howe, Prosecutors Move to
Dismiss Charges Against McDonnells, SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 8, 2016, 4:31 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/prosecutors-move-to-dismiss-charges-against-mcdonnells/
[https://perma.cc/CZC4-2YKA]. To do so, the prosecution’s theory would be that by
meeting with the officials, McDonnell was trying to pressure them into researching the
supplement, and that pressuring is sufficient. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355,
2371 (2016). Even the McDonnell opinion noted that the jury could have reasonably found
McDonnell guilty under the new jury instructions. See id. at 2374–75.
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appeals more frequently.140 However, McDonnell’s impact will be best
learned by reviewing the decisions of district courts applying
McDonnell’s new standard at trial. Appellate review is deferential—
appellate courts must only decide whether the trial court’s decision
met a certain standard of review, such as the plain error rule and
sufficiency of the evidence standards. As a result, appellate courts do
not often actually apply the law to a case’s facts to determine whether
a person is guilty of the charged crimes.141 In Silver and Skelos, the
Second Circuit vacated convictions because of procedural
deficiencies, which did not require the court to find that the
defendants were innocent.142 As a result, the best way to measure
McDonnell’s impact is to analyze subsequent corruption trials and
examine how the new definition of official act—which the jury likely
will hear verbatim in the court’s jury instructions—may have affected
the outcome.
No major corruption trials have reached a decision since the
Supreme Court issued the McDonnell decision. The trial of Robert
Menendez, a United States Senator from New Jersey facing

140. Although circuit courts are beginning to hear more of these cases, the Supreme
Court is not. Jack Newsham, Supreme Court Won’t Review NYC Lawmaker’s Bribery
Case, LAW360 (Feb. 21, 2017, 3:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/893944/supremecourt-won-t-review-nyc-lawmaker-s-bribery-case [https://perma.cc/D29C-AFJC (staffuploaded archive)] (reporting that the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari for a
McDonnell-based appeal).
141. See United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279, 288–89 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[A]n appellate
court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant
demonstrates that (1) there is an ‘error’; (2) the error is ‘clear or obvious, rather than
subject to reasonable dispute’; (3) the error ‘affected the appellant’s substantial rights,
which in the ordinary case means’ it ‘affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings’; and (4) ‘the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.’” (citations omitted)); Silver, 864 F.3d at 113 (“We
review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, but must uphold the conviction if
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Vernace,
811 F.3d 609, 615 (2d Cir. 2016))).
142. Silver, 864 F.3d at 106; Skelos, 707 F. App’x at 736. In Silver, the Court suggested
the opposite and openly acknowledged their limitations when reaching its decision:
We recognize that many would view the facts adduced at Silver’s trial with
distaste. The question presented to us, however, is not how a jury would likely
view the evidence presented by the Government. Rather, it is whether it is clear,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that a rational jury, properly instructed, would have
found Silver guilty. Given the teachings of the Supreme Court in McDonnell, and
the particular circumstances of this case, we simply cannot reach that conclusion.
Accordingly, we are required to vacate the honest services fraud and extortion
counts against Silver, as well as the money laundering count.
Silver, 864 F.3d at 124.
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corruption charges, was the first major opportunity to evaluate
McDonnell’s impact on these types of crimes. 143 The McDonnell
decision loomed large over the proceedings: the judge declared that
this trial was the first time a trial court had been required to craft jury
instructions reflecting McDonnell’s official act standard.144 The judge
quoted McDonnell when instructing the jury on the definition of
official act, 145 and the attorneys for both parties focused on this
definition in their closing arguments.146 However, the jury could not
reach a unanimous verdict, causing the judge to declare a mistrial.147
Consequently, McDonnell’s impact on corruption trials remains
unclear.148 Once more courts consider McDonnell-based claims and
identify its application to different potential official acts, the
decision’s true impact may be properly measured.149

143. See Nick Corasaniti, Menendez Trial Judge Rejects Motion to Dismiss the Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/nyregion/menendezcorruption-trial-dismissal-denied.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2KSZ-3D9U (dark archive)]
(reporting on the decision by the court to reject a motion to dismiss and send the case to a
jury); Bill Wichert, Menendez Jury Instructions Crafted With Eye On McDonnell, LAW360
(Oct. 31, 2017, 10:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/980047/menendez-juryinstructions-crafted-with-eye-on-mcdonnell
[https://perma.cc/WL7J-SWLT
(staffuploaded archive)] (explaining that the New Jersey federal judge would be the first trial
court to apply McDonnell to jury instructions).
144. Wichert, supra note 143.
145. See id.
146. See Charles Toutant, Jury Begins Deliberations in Menendez Trial After Being
Told of Narrower Standard for Bribery, N.J. L.J. (Nov. 06, 2017, 6:00 PM),
https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/sites/njlawjournal/2017/11/06/jury-begins-deliberations-in
-menendez-trial-after-being-told-of-narrower-standard-for-bribery/
[https://perma.cc/F3GS-HJJJ (staff-uploaded archive)].
147. Nick Corasaniti & Nate Schweber, Corruption Case Against Senator Menendez
Ends in Mistrial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16
/nyregion/senator-robert-menendez-corruption.html [https://perma.cc/34GY-P5NU (dark
archive)]. One former prosecutor predicted this outcome because he thought “the
government had a fairly unusual theory of prosecution, the stream of benefits theory, with
the constraints imposed by McDonnell.” Charles Toutant, Amid Deadlock and Juror
Remarks, Is Menendez Trial Foundering?, N.J. L.J. (Nov. 13, 2017, 7:07 PM),
https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/sites/njlawjournal/2017/11/13/amid-deadlock-and-jurorremarks-is-menendez-trial-foundering/ [https://perma.cc/G2NJ-88E6].
148. A Menendez retrial could have helped clarify McDonnell’s impact, but the U.S.
Attorney’s Office decided against retrying Menendez after the trial judge dismissed some
of Menendez’s charges. Nick Corasaniti, Justice Department Dismisses Corruption Case
Against Menendez, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/31
/nyregion/justice-department-moves-to-dismiss-corruption-case-against-menendez.html
[https://perma.cc/B7HA-MG5H (dark archive)].
149. The 2018 calendar year may provide that opportunity with the scheduled Silver
and Skelos retrials and other upcoming corruption trials. See Devlin-Brown & Dee, supra
note 60, at 985 (explaining that “prosecutors have continued to bring aggressive public
corruption cases” and providing examples of such cases which may soon be resolved);
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Additional Limitations When Measuring McDonnell’s Impact

Even as more courts begin to apply McDonnell, the opinion’s
circumstances and novelty means that several fact-specific
interpretations of the precedent are needed to fully understand its
impact. The Supreme Court adopted a pretty narrow definition of
“official act” to hold McDonnell’s meeting with government officials
to promote Williams’ product—his most suspect action—as a nonofficial act.150 As a result, this holding does not lend itself to a rule of
general applicability. Further, the Court provided only a few
examples of official acts 151 and a few related examples of what
constitutes acting on a specific question, the second element of an
official act. 152 Having only a few examples illustrating a narrow
holding does not help draw the line much, either. In addition, the
Court only offered a general description for what actions amount to a
formal exercise of government power—the first element of the
definition of official act. 153 The Court explained that it means
something “similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court, a
determination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee.”154
Although observers and future litigants know that a formal exercise
of government power is one of the above three examples, public
officials act in many more ways. As a result, it is difficult to pinpoint
what actions satisfy the elements of an official act.

Rosner & Whitehouse, supra note 138 (noting the upcoming dates of the Silver and Skelos
retrials).
150. See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2370 (2016); see Silverglate &
Quinn-Judge, supra note 107, at 205.
151. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370 (stating that “a decision or action to initiate a
research study,” “a decision or action on a qualifying step, such as narrowing down the list
of potential research topics,” “[a] public official . . . using his official position to exert
pressure on another official to perform an ‘official act,’” and “a public official us[ing] his
official position to provide advice to another official, knowing or intending that such
advice will form the basis for an ‘official act’ by another official . . . can [all] qualify as a
decision or action for purposes of § 201(a)(3).”).
152. Id. at 2370–71; see supra notes 34, 37–40 and accompanying text (stating the
second element of an official act and discussing its application in McDonnell). Examples of
the second element, making a decision or acting on some question, include public officials,
acting in their official capacity: (1) initiating research studies, or at least taking a
“qualifying step, such as narrowing down the list of potential research topics”; (2)
pressuring “another official to perform an ‘official act’”; (3) “provid[ing] advice to another
official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an ‘official act’ by
another official”; (4) agreeing to “make a decision or take an action on a ‘question, matter,
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.’” Id. at 2370–72.
153. See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368–69.
154. Id. at 2372 (emphasis added).
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These vague descriptions offer courts considerable flexibility
when they apply the McDonnell precedent. Taken together, the
examples and definitions that the Court provided will only mandate a
clear outcome in just a few types of cases. Thus—despite the Court’s
attempt to narrow the definition of official act and its narrow
holding155—in most corruption cases, lower courts will be applying a
broad framework. Even those who support the spirit of the holding in
McDonnell think future courts have considerable flexibility to
determine that an official’s action is an official act under corruption
laws.156 Given this uncertainty, courts could choose to focus more on
other elements of public corruption statutes, such as the charged
official’s mens rea.157 Doing so would allow courts to interject their
own policy conclusions about the political process into the McDonnell
official act definition, resulting in case law that bases corruption
convictions on certain acts which the McDonnell Court may have
intended to exclude.158 Ultimately, more cases are needed to flesh out
this opaque precedent.
CONCLUSION
Even though McDonnell resulted from a unanimous Court, this
decision should be read narrowly because of its questionable analysis
of corruption laws and policy concerns. In adopting a narrow
definition of official act, the Court relied on policy arguments that, on
their face, seem persuasive. However, closer examination of the
Court’s policy and legal arguments reveals that the Court did not
understand the broader picture. It failed to consider how people
155. See supra notes 33–43 and accompanying text.
156. See Devlin-Brown & Monju, supra note 94 (“[T]he further any one of the legs of
the quid pro quo is from the heartland of political corruption, and the closer it is to the
typical functioning of representative government, the less likely a jury will be to convict
and the less likely a court will be to uphold a conviction. [Only] [w]hen the prosecution
has little evidence of official acts beyond mere access, a McDonnell defense may be the
most attractive.”); Silverglate & Quinn-Judge, supra note 107, at 204 (arguing that this
definition, though purportedly narrow, will likely prove to be broad and subject to
“substantial expansion”).
157. For discussion on why courts should do so, see supra III.B. Also, McDonnell’s
unanimity on the issue of access in politics departs from a usual split among justices on this
issue. In the most recent cases that disregarded preferential access’s potential impact—
Citizens United and McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014)—the majority only had
five justices. As a result, lower courts could be more skeptical of McDonnell’s true value.
158. Lower courts have historically applied more expansive readings of corruption
crimes, which increases the likelihood of this happening. Silverglate & Quinn-Judge, supra
note 107, at 208 (“The other possibility, of course, given the history of expansive readings
of public corruption statutes, is that the courts of appeals will undercut any specificity
requirement . . . .”).
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already distrust their government and mistook a benefactor’s
improper preferential access as a core element of democracy. It also
viewed the official act element of bribery in a vacuum, not explaining
how the other four elements of bribery might quell their concern for
protecting constituent services. Instead of protecting the political
process as it hoped, this decision will only make the American public
more skeptical of its representatives and potentially reduce their
willingness to participate in the political process. Lower courts have
not yet fleshed out this new fact-intensive standard. However, those
future opinions could very well find sufficient facts to broaden
McDonnell’s narrow, but still ambiguous, standard and focus instead
on the defendants’ mens rea. Future courts choosing to rely on the
mens rea element will assuage the McDonnell Court’s concerns about
undercutting representative democracy and instead result in decisions
that protect representative democracy—those which punish public
officials responsive only to special interests.
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